Inequality: Has The Income Gap Narrowed?

Two icons of the Left -- economist Thomas Piketty and Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) -- talking about rising inequality last June.  But by some measures, inequality is shrinking.  [Credit: National Review]

Two icons of the Left — econ­o­mist Thomas Piket­ty and Sen­a­tor Eliz­a­beth War­ren (D‑MA) — dis­cussing ris­ing inequal­i­ty dur­ing an event last June. But by some mea­sures, inequal­i­ty is shrink­ing, not ris­ing. [Cred­it: Nation­al Review]

“The game right now in Amer­i­ca is rigged. It is rigged so that those at the top keep doing bet­ter and bet­ter, and every­one else is under increas­ing pres­sure, is under increas­ing eco­nom­ic strain…And that is the pro­found dan­ger that we see from great inequal­i­ty.” Eliz­a­beth War­ren (D‑MA)

Democ­rats are still sting­ing from last month’s epic defeat at the polls.  Some of them attribute that unhap­py out­come to ide­o­log­i­cal tem­per­ance.  The par­ty would do bet­ter, some argue, if their can­di­dates took a more stri­dent tone, denounc­ing the rich, preach­ing that Wash­ing­ton gov­erns in the ser­vice of Wall Street, and call­ing for more aggres­sive redis­tri­b­u­tion of income and wealth to damp­en ris­ing inequality.

But a new study pub­lished in the South­ern Eco­nom­ic Jour­nal pulls at a crit­i­cal thread of that nar­ra­tive.  It found that, at least accord­ing to one mea­sure of income, the gap between rich and poor actu­al­ly nar­rowed between 1989 and 2007.

The study’s authors – Philip Armour and Richard V. Burkhauser of Cor­nell Uni­ver­si­ty and Jeff Lar­ri­more of the U.S. Fed­er­al Reserve Board – showed that mea­sur­ing inequal­i­ty is a tricky busi­ness, one that is high­ly depen­dent on how researchers define income.  The table below sum­ma­rizes some of their findings.

Three Mea­sures of Inequality

Average Inflation-Adjusted Growth in Income, 1989–2007

  (1) (2) (3)
What does it measure? Cash mar­ket income Post-tax and trans­fer income, adjust­ed for house­hold size Col­umn (2) + accrued cap­i­tal gains (includes housing)
Who used the measure? Piket­ty Numer­ous researchers Armour, et al.
Bot­tom quintile -32.9 9.9 13.7
Sec­ond quintile 0.8 10.8 9.0
Mid­dle quintile 2.3 12.6 6.6
Fourth quin­tile 8.0 14.4 6.1
Top quin­tile 12.9 15.1 0.7
Top 5 percent 9.9 12.7 -2.7

The first col­umn presents the sort of data that Sen­a­tor War­ren most typ­i­cal­ly cites.  It is based on the method­ol­o­gy used by world-renowned French econ­o­mist Thomas Piket­ty.  It mea­sures “cash mar­ket income” – essen­tial­ly mon­ey that house­holds receive through labor or invest­ment.  By this mea­sure, which looks at pre-tax earn­ings, things dark­ened between 1989 and 2007 for house­holds in the low­est quin­tile (i.e., the low­est 20 per­cent of earn­ers).  Their aver­age, infla­tion-adjust­ed earn­ings dropped by near­ly one-third (32.9 per­cent).  And while those in the mid­dle quin­tile bare­ly kept their heads above water (a 2.3 per­cent real income increase), those at the top did just fine, increas­ing their income by 12.9 per­cent.  The rich got rich­er, the poor got poor­er and the mid­dle class stagnated.

This pic­ture, how­ev­er, is not entire­ly accu­rate.  Because it mea­sures only pre-tax income, the Pick­et­ty method­ol­o­gy over­looks the redis­trib­u­tive effects of a pro­gres­sive tax regime and the trans­fer ben­e­fits these tax­es (and gov­ern­ment bor­row­ing) finance: Social Secu­ri­ty, Medicare, Med­ic­aid, and more than 100 wel­fare pro­grams.  By ignor­ing the tax­es the rich pay and the ben­e­fits that poor and mid­dle income house­holds receive, the Piket­ty method omits some rather crit­i­cal data.

It is also fails to take into account social changes.  Peo­ple are hav­ing few­er chil­dren and liv­ing arrange­ments are much dif­fer­ent than in pre­vi­ous gen­er­a­tions.  Two work­ing adults liv­ing togeth­er and shar­ing expens­es are count­ed as two sep­a­rate house­holds in the data sets Piket­ty uses, but are in fact a sin­gle unit.  An accu­rate method­ol­o­gy must account for such changes in house­hold composition.

The sec­ond col­umn, which relies to a large extent on Cen­sus Bureau data, adjusts both for house­hold com­po­si­tion and the effects of tax­es and trans­fer ben­e­fits.  This changes the pic­ture dra­mat­i­cal­ly for the low­est quin­tile, whose medi­an income, after account­ing for tax­es, ben­e­fits and house­hold com­po­si­tion, grew by 9.9 per­cent instead of shrink­ing by 32.9 per­cent.  The remain­ing quin­tiles also fared bet­ter under this def­i­n­i­tion of income.  Still, inequal­i­ty grew, with the aver­age earn­ings of the top quin­tile increas­ing by 15.1 percent.

The third col­umn rep­re­sents the method­ol­o­gy employed by the authors to com­pute income inequal­i­ty.  In addi­tion to the Cen­sus Bureau data, they look at the Fed­er­al Reserve’s Sur­vey of Con­sumer Finances, which pro­vides data on house­hold assets held in both tax­able (e.g., bank accounts, mutu­al funds) and non-tax­able (e.g., IRAs, 401(k)s) accounts.  They also fac­tor in data from the House Price Index pub­lished by the Fed­er­al Hous­ing Finance Agency.  They use these data to impute “accrued cap­i­tal gains” to households.

Col­umn (3) shows the rather star­tling results of includ­ing these addi­tion­al bits of infor­ma­tion.  The big win­ners since 1989 have been peo­ple in the bot­tom quin­tile, whose aver­age incomes rose by 13.7 per­cent between 1989 and 2007.  The biggest losers were those Sen­a­tor War­ren loves to hate: peo­ple in the top quin­tile, whose incomes grew by less than 1 per­cent over that peri­od, and the top 5 per­cent, who expe­ri­enced a 2.7 per­cent reduc­tion in their net income.

The authors’ method­ol­o­gy is not with­out con­tro­ver­sy.  The Sur­vey of Con­sumer Finances sam­ples only 5,000 house­holds every three years.  It is thus much less com­pre­hen­sive than either IRS or Cen­sus Bureau data.  More­over, the survey’s method­ol­o­gy changed so much that the authors chose not to use data col­lect­ed before 1989.

Crit­ics also object to the idea of imput­ing income based on accrued cap­i­tal gains.  The fact that your house is appre­ci­at­ing in val­ue or your IRA did well this year doesn’t nec­es­sar­i­ly give you more income.  On the oth­er hand, mea­sur­ing only tax­able, real­ized cap­i­tal gains also has lim­i­ta­tions.  The gov­ern­ment, for exam­ple, doesn’t tax cap­i­tal gains on the sale of a res­i­dence unless that gain exceeds $500,000.  The aver­age price of a home owned by a fam­i­ly in the mid­dle quin­tile rose by near­ly $66,000 between 1989 and 2007.  A home­own­er who real­ized that amount paid no tax­es on the sale of the home.  In mea­sur­ing house­hold income, that $66,000 arguably should be account­ed for.  The authors account for it by imput­ing that cap­i­tal gain to home­own­ers as aver­age hous­ing prices change over time.

Sim­i­lar­ly, house­holds in the bot­tom quin­tile had an aver­age of near­ly $43,000 in total equi­ty invest­ment assets in 2007, accord­ing to the Fed­er­al Reserve data.  While imput­ing them accrued cap­i­tal gains may seem an imper­fect way of valu­ing these sav­ings, it is arguably bet­ter than ignor­ing them entirely.

The Con­gres­sion­al Bud­get Office, in an analy­sis pub­lished last month, pro­vides a fourth way to com­pare income across quin­tiles.  Like the authors, they take into account tax­es and trans­fer pay­ments.  Unlike the authors, they treat only tax­able cap­i­tal gains as income, ignor­ing many assets that house­holds own.  The chart below (click to enlarge) shows the Gini Index between 1979 and 2011 that CBO com­put­ed based on its method­ol­o­gy.  The Gini Index is a com­mon­ly used mea­sure of income inequal­i­ty that varies between 0 and 1.  A soci­ety in which everyone’s income was equal would get a score of 0; one in which one per­son gets all the income and the rest get noth­ing would get a score of 1.

GINI per CBO blue bkgd

So has inequal­i­ty increased in the U.S.?  As for­mer Sen­a­tor Phil Gramm and econ­o­mist Mike Solon not­ed in a recent Wall Street Jour­nal piece, the answer to that ques­tion depends very much on which year you choose to begin your analy­sis.  If you choose 1979 as the base year, the CBO data would show a 22 per­cent increase in the Gini coef­fi­cient (.358 to .436).  But if you were to select 1985, the change would be just 6 per­cent (.410 to .436).

Nei­ther rep­re­sents a com­plete pic­ture.  The Gini coef­fi­cient has expe­ri­enced three big run-ups since 1979: dur­ing the cen­tral bank’s 1980s war against infla­tion, the dot­com bub­ble of the mid to late 1990s and the hous­ing bub­ble that burst in 2007.  All three spikes in the Gini index coin­cid­ed with ambi­tious cen­tral bank inter­ven­tions.  In the after­math, the index trend­ed down­ward.  The most abrupt decline occurred when hous­ing and equi­ty prices plum­met­ed after 2007.  The Gini index fell by near­ly nine per­cent between 2007 and 2009.  Since then, it has drift­ed upward.

Where it has head­ed since 2011 is dif­fi­cult to say.  The Fed­er­al Reserve has pur­sued extra­or­di­nary mon­e­tary pol­i­cy since 2009 and there has been a con­comi­tant rise in equi­ty prices.  Both would sug­gest that the Gini index would have tracked high­er over the past three years.

Eco­nom­ic growth, how­ev­er, has been tepid and gov­ern­ment has been fis­cal­ly hyper­ac­tive.  Obamacare’s new tax­es on the rich took effect in 2013, and Con­gress also vot­ed to raise the top rate in Jan­u­ary of that year. Those tax­es will adverse­ly affect high income house­holds.  The new health law will extend an esti­mat­ed $1.8 tril­lion in income-relat­ed health insur­ance sub­si­dies between 2014 and 2023, most of which will ben­e­fit those in the bot­tom quin­tile.  Mid­dle income house­holds are tak­ing a hit, since a good por­tion of Oba­macare’s new spend­ing is off­set by reduc­ing the val­ue of Medicare ben­e­fits to seniors.  The new law’s thick­et of reg­u­la­tions also has erod­ed employ­er-spon­sored health ben­e­fits that most mid­dle income house­holds enjoy.  That ero­sion will con­tin­ue at least until 2018, when the gov­ern­ment will impose a 40 per­cent excise tax on cov­er­age that it deems to be over­ly gen­er­ous.  How this all will play out is any­one’s guess.

Inequal­i­ty, in short, is very dif­fi­cult to pre­dict and quan­ti­fy.  It is high­ly depen­dent on what econ­o­mists mea­sure and how they mea­sure it.  No per­fect index exists and var­i­ous method­olo­gies pro­duce wild­ly dif­fer­ent results.  It is a sub­ject whose nature, caus­es and reme­dies demand more study.

Instead, it will fuel more dem­a­goguery.  The Left will pro­mote its dis­tort­ed nar­ra­tive to incite racial and “class” resent­ments and direct that ani­mos­i­ty against Repub­li­cans.  They also will use it to advance tired and inef­fec­tive pol­i­cy bro­mides, like increas­ing the min­i­mum wage, reward­ing stu­dents for not mak­ing time­ly pay­ments on their col­lege loans, and con­fis­cat­ing more of the wealth and income of suc­cess­ful indi­vid­u­als and businesses.

Aggres­sive redis­tri­b­u­tion­ist schemes, which rely heav­i­ly on the polit­i­cal sys­tem to allo­cate the fruits of pri­vate sec­tor out­put, have failed to arrest inequal­i­ty in Europe, as Piketty’s own data attest.  But that won’t stop his dis­ci­ples from join­ing him in call­ing on gov­ern­ment to dou­ble down on those ill-con­ceived policies.

The eco­nom­ics of envy, as Gramm and Solon not­ed, don’t work.  Democ­rats are fer­vent­ly hop­ing that the pol­i­tics of envy will.