The Fed On The Road To Nowhere

Economic policymakers may have us, as the Talking Heads put it in their 1985 hit, on the road to nowhere. [Credit: qednet.biz]

Eco­nom­ic pol­i­cy­mak­ers may have us, as the Talk­ing Heads put it in their 1985 hit, on the road to nowhere. [Cred­it: qednet.biz]

For­mer Fed­er­al Reserve Chair­man Ben Bernanke has been called the man who saved the world.  His extra­or­di­nary inter­ven­tions in the fall of 2008 have almost uni­ver­sal­ly been rec­og­nized as hav­ing pre­vent­ed a sec­ond Great Depression.

But a new study by the Swiss-based Bank for Inter­na­tion­al Set­tle­ments (BIS) sug­gests that Bernanke saved the world from a cri­sis that was at least part­ly of his own mak­ing.  Worse, it argues that the course he set and that his suc­ces­sor Janet Yellen and oth­er cen­tral banks are fol­low­ing will pro­duce anoth­er and per­haps graver crisis.

Gov­ern­ment mon­e­tary and fis­cal pol­i­cy­mak­ers have lost their way, the BIS argues.  So bad­ly that they don’t just need a new direc­tion.  They need a new compass.

Draw­ing heav­i­ly on the past work of the head of the BIS’s Mon­e­tary and Eco­nom­ic Depart­ment Clau­dio Borio, the organization’s annu­al report blames pol­i­cy blun­ders by fis­cal and mon­e­tary offi­cials in the gov­ern­ments of advanced economies for the Great Recession.

The pro­logue to the Great Reces­sion is well known. A major finan­cial boom devel­oped against the back­drop of low and sta­ble infla­tion, tur­bocharged, as so often in past such episodes, by finan­cial inno­va­tion. Cred­it and prop­er­ty prices soared, shrug­ging off a shal­low reces­sion in the ear­ly 2000s and boost­ing eco­nom­ic growth once more. Spir­its ran high. There was talk of a Great Mod­er­a­tion – a gen­er­al sense that pol­i­cy­mak­ers had final­ly tamed the busi­ness cycle and uncov­ered the deep­est secrets of the econ­o­my (p. 10).

But the Great Mod­er­a­tion abrupt­ly gave way to fears of a Great Depres­sion, fears that sparked the mon­e­tary and fis­cal impro­vi­sa­tions of 2008 that “pre­vent­ed the finan­cial sys­tem and the econ­o­my from plung­ing into a tail­spin” (p. 11).

Once the worst of the cri­sis had passed, the Fed and oth­er gov­ern­ment agen­cies failed to piv­ot from cri­sis man­age­ment to cri­sis res­o­lu­tion, the BIS argues. They did not address the prob­lems that were both the cause and effect of the bust with the bit­ter med­i­cine of debt reduc­tion and price dis­cov­ery.  Instead they fell back on tra­di­tion­al pol­i­cy bro­mides – heavy gov­ern­ment bor­row­ing (deficits) and accom­moda­tive mon­e­tary pol­i­cy (zero inter­est rates and asset pur­chas­es) – that have stunt­ed eco­nom­ic recov­ery and threat­ened future crises.  Hav­ing not learned from their errors, they seem deter­mined to repeat them.

In no small mea­sure, the caus­es of the post-cri­sis malaise are those of the cri­sis itself – they lie in a col­lec­tive fail­ure to get to grips with the finan­cial cycle. Address­ing this fail­ure calls for adjust­ments to pol­i­cy frame­works – fis­cal, mon­e­tary and pru­den­tial – to ensure a more sym­met­ri­cal response across booms and busts. And it calls for mov­ing away from debt as the main engine of growth. Oth­er­wise, the risk is that insta­bil­i­ty will entrench itself in the glob­al econ­o­my and room for pol­i­cy maneu­ver will run out. (p. 8)

The BIS cri­tique draws a sharp dis­tinc­tion between busi­ness cycles – which aver­age 1 to 8 years in length – and the booms and busts asso­ci­at­ed with finan­cial cycles, whose time­frame is longer and whose peaks and troughs are more pro­nounced.  Gov­ern­ments tend to focus on the busi­ness cycle, treat­ing reces­sions with big­ger deficits and low­er inter­est rates that are thought to induce eco­nom­ic growth and reduce joblessness.

Those poli­cies have fall­en flat in the near­ly six years that have passed since the Lehman Broth­ers bank­rupt­cy.  “The post-cri­sis peri­od,” the BIS says, “has been dis­ap­point­ing,” char­ac­ter­ized by a “slow and weak recov­ery,” unem­ploy­ment “well above pre-cri­sis lev­els,” and the grim real­i­ty that “we have not made up lost ground” (p. 8).  “The longer term out­look for growth,” mean­while, “is far from bright,” large­ly because of dis­ap­point­ing pro­duc­tiv­i­ty growth on top of a longer-term trend decline (p.9).  Gov­ern­men­t’s fix­a­tion on stim­u­lat­ing demand at the expense of increas­ing out­put is in part to blame for the tepid recovery.

There is some good news, the report acknowl­edges.  Infla­tion remains low, fears of defla­tion have not mate­ri­al­ized (though they per­sist in the euro­zone), and “finan­cial mar­kets have been exu­ber­ant over the past year, at least in advanced economies, danc­ing main­ly to the tune of cen­tral bank deci­sions” (p. 9).

That exu­ber­ance doesn’t square with eco­nom­ic real­i­ty.  “It is hard to avoid the sense of a puz­zling dis­con­nect between the mar­kets’ buoy­an­cy and under­ly­ing eco­nom­ic devel­op­ments glob­al­ly” (p. 9).

Glob­al finan­cial mar­kets, the report says, are lev­i­tat­ing “under the spell of mon­e­tary pol­i­cy” (p. 23).  That pol­i­cy con­tin­ues to favor increased debt over bal­ance sheet repair (debt reduc­tion).  Enabled by loose mon­e­tary pol­i­cy, the total debt of pri­vate non-finan­cial sec­tors has risen glob­al­ly by 30 per­cent since the cri­sis, while the pub­lic sec­tor debt-to-GDP ratio of G7 coun­tries has grown by near­ly 40 per­cent over that span (p. 9).

It is pre­cise­ly this debt, along with increased prop­er­ty prices, that exac­er­bate the boom phase of the finan­cial cycle, accord­ing to a Decem­ber 2012 BIS paper, lead­ing to big­ger and more dev­as­tat­ing busts (p.2).  The effects of these busts are, as we are learn­ing, very dif­fi­cult to shake off.

To rem­e­dy this, the report argues, gov­ern­ments should pur­sue coun­ter­cycli­cal mon­e­tary, fis­cal and reg­u­la­to­ry poli­cies that lean against booms and reserve more accom­moda­tive poli­cies for respond­ing to busts.

The over­all strat­e­gy for nation­al pol­i­cy frame­works should be to ensure that buffers are built up dur­ing a finan­cial boom so that they can be drawn down in the bust. Such buffers would make the econ­o­my more resilient to a down­turn. And, by act­ing as a kind of sea anchor, they could also damp­en the boom’s inten­si­ty. Their effect would be to make pol­i­cy less pro­cycli­cal by ren­der­ing it more sym­met­ri­cal with respect to the boom and bust phas­es of the finan­cial cycle. This would avoid a pro­gres­sive loss of pol­i­cy room for maneu­ver over time (p. 19).

Instead, gov­ern­ments have pur­sued fis­cal and mon­e­tary poli­cies ill-suit­ed both to booms and busts.  Fis­cal pol­i­cy, the report observes:

lags fur­thest behind. There is lit­tle recog­ni­tion of the huge flat­ter­ing effect that finan­cial booms have on the fis­cal accounts: they cause poten­tial out­put and growth to be over­es­ti­mat­ed, are par­tic­u­lar­ly gen­er­ous to the fis­cal cof­fers, and mask the build-up of con­tin­gent lia­bil­i­ties need­ed to address the con­se­quences of the busts…Similarly, there is scant appre­ci­a­tion of the lim­i­ta­tions of an expan­sion­ary fis­cal pol­i­cy dur­ing a bal­ance sheet reces­sion; indeed, the pre­vail­ing view is that fis­cal pol­i­cy is more effec­tive under such conditions.

Nor are cen­tral banks prop­er­ly cal­i­brat­ing mon­e­tary pol­i­cy.  The Fed that kept inter­est rates too low for too long and there­by helped pro­duce the real estate bub­ble has respond­ed to the burst­ing of that bub­ble with quan­ti­ta­tive eas­ing and near-zero rates that have last­ed more than 5–1/2 years and are pro­ject­ed to con­tin­ue at least into 2015 and per­haps beyond.  The Fed fears rais­ing those rates, cit­ing the risk of mon­e­tary tight­en­ing amid tepid eco­nom­ic growth and ele­vat­ed unem­ploy­ment. That deci­sion could prove every bit as wrong-head­ed as the accom­moda­tive poli­cies that helped pre­cip­i­tate the Great Reces­sion, accord­ing to the BIS.

Mon­e­tary pol­i­cy … has been over­bur­dened for too long. After so many years of an excep­tion­al mon­e­tary expan­sion, the risk of nor­mal­iz­ing too slow­ly and too late deserves spe­cial atten­tion (p. 20).

Those risks are real and ominous.

The risks of fail­ing to act should not be under­es­ti­mat­ed. The glob­al econ­o­my may be set on an unsus­tain­able path. And at some point, the cur­rent open glob­al trade and finan­cial order could be seri­ous­ly threat­ened. (p. 20)

Pre­serv­ing that order requires tak­ing polit­i­cal­ly dif­fi­cult decisions.

There is lit­tle appetite for tak­ing the long-term view. Few are ready to curb finan­cial booms that make every­one feel illu­sive­ly rich­er. Or to hold back on quick fix­es for out­put slow­downs, even if such mea­sures threat­en to add fuel to unsus­tain­able finan­cial booms. Or to address bal­ance sheet prob­lems head-on dur­ing a bust when seem­ing­ly eas­i­er poli­cies are on offer. The temp­ta­tion to go for short­cuts is sim­ply too strong, even if these short­cuts lead nowhere in the end (p. 21).

The BIS report offers this unwel­come piece of advice to eco­nom­ic pol­i­cy­mak­ers who are, as David Byrne once sang, on the road to nowhere: get a new compass.

One thought on “The Fed On The Road To Nowhere”

  1. The fla­grant­ly irre­spon­si­ble fed­er­al reserve gov­er­nors have made the cur­rent bub­ble the entire econ­o­my by print­ing dol­lars out of thin air and pump­ing them into the econ­o­my through the “bond pur­chase” door. Who will bal­ance the fed ledger, now at unprece­dent­ed deficit- our chil­dren? Grand­chil­dren? They will write the his­to­ry that the greed­i­est gen­er­a­tion fol­lowed the great­est gen­er­a­tion and left them the bill.

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