Trump Is (Sort Of) Right About Yellen

Donald Trump this week said that Federal Reserve Board Chairman Janet Yellen won't raise rates because President Obama told her not to. Why he's (sort of) right. [Credit: CNBC]

Don­ald Trump this week said that Fed­er­al Reserve Board Chair­man Janet Yellen won’t raise rates because Pres­i­dent Oba­ma told her not to. Why he’s (sort of) right. [Cred­it: CNBC]

The media just can’t keep up with The Donald.

Cor­po­rate news-gath­er­ing out­lets do their best to repeat and ampli­fy his every off­beat utter­ance.  His accu­sa­tion that Mar­co Rubio is a “dis­as­ter with his cred­it cards” has rip­pled through the press and forced Rubio to respond.  Dit­to for Trump’s mock­ery of Jeb’s ener­gy, Carson’s reli­gion, Carly’s face, Kasich’s poll num­bers, Hillary’s mar­i­tal rela­tions  (“If Hillary Clin­ton can’t sat­is­fy her hus­band what makes her think she can sat­is­fy Amer­i­ca?”), Bernie’s men­tal health and the men­stru­al cycles of debate moderators.

But as they were buzzing about his sched­uled appear­ance on Sat­ur­day Night Live, the media large­ly over­looked what was per­haps Trump’s most hereti­cal accu­sa­tion of all.

“In my opin­ion [Fed­er­al Reserve Chair­man] Janet Yellen is high­ly polit­i­cal,” Trump said dur­ing a press con­fer­ence to pro­mote his new book, “and she’s not rais­ing rates for a very spe­cif­ic rea­son: because Oba­ma told her not to.”

Leave aside for the moment that there is absolute­ly no evi­dence that the Pres­i­dent has “told” Yellen not to raise rates.  Indeed, she sug­gest­ed at a Con­gres­sion­al hear­ing this week that the Fed might raise them next month, some­thing that seems more pos­si­ble in light of the Octo­ber jobs report.  Facts rarely con­strain The Donald.

Trump’s het­ero­doxy is his asser­tion that Yellen is “high­ly polit­i­cal,” a state­ment that tears at the core mythol­o­gy of the Fed as a post-mod­ern priest­hood that dis­pas­sion­ate­ly exam­ines the entrails of eco­nom­ic data, entire­ly unsul­lied by politics.

The Fed­er­al Open Mar­ket Com­mit­tee sets mon­e­tary pol­i­cy in pur­suit of its mis­sion “to help pro­mote nation­al eco­nom­ic goals.” Its ten mem­bers com­prise aca­d­e­mics and bankers, includ­ing two for­mer exec­u­tives from Cit­i­group and one each from the Car­lyle Group and Gold­man Sachs. Four of them pre­vi­ous­ly held polit­i­cal posi­tions in the exec­u­tive branch.  All of them are polit­i­cal appointees.

Their upcom­ing actions — or inac­tions — are espe­cial­ly momen­tous now, com­ing as they do after near­ly sev­en years of hold­ing inter­est rates near zero and load­ing their bal­ance sheet with $2.5 tril­lion in Trea­sury debt (mak­ing the Fed the Trea­sury Department’s sec­ond largest cred­i­tor, after Social Secu­ri­ty) and $1.7 tril­lion in mort­gage-backed secu­ri­ties.  The Fed­er­al Reserve has nev­er before imple­ment­ed such poli­cies, so there is no his­tor­i­cal expe­ri­ence to inform pre­dic­tions of what will hap­pen when the Fed begins to unwind them..

The Fed’s Chair­man doesn’t hes­i­tate to claim that its actions helped “sta­bi­lize the finan­cial sys­tem dur­ing the cri­sis” of 2008 and that they have since “sup­port­ed the eco­nom­ic recov­ery,” though that recov­ery has been ane­mic and spas­mod­ic.  The Fed’s poli­cies, she argues, have made a difference.

If imple­men­ta­tion of these poli­cies has been so pow­er­ful an elixir, their rever­sal pre­sum­ably also will have pro­found effects that will ric­o­chet through the glob­al econ­o­my. Yellen’s year-long flir­ta­tion with rais­ing inter­est rates already has affect­ed glob­al mar­kets, engen­der­ing spec­u­la­tive trades that have helped strength­en the dol­lar, dri­ve down com­mod­i­ty prices and roil devel­op­ing economies.

There is no telling what will hap­pen when the Fed actu­al­ly begins to raise rates.  Yellen knows that risk and uncer­tain­ty attend such a change in pol­i­cy.  And she is acute­ly aware of the poten­tial polit­i­cal implications.

If the stock mar­ket went side­ways in an elec­tion year or the econ­o­my soured, Demo­c­ra­t­ic can­di­dates would like­ly suf­fer at the polls.  Yellen does­n’t want that to hap­pen, and cer­tain­ly does­n’t want to be remem­bered for help­ing put a Repub­li­can in the White House. That con­cern — and not mind-numb­ing vol­umes of eco­nom­ic indi­ca­tors alone — affects her decisions.

The Fed’s apol­o­gists would have us believe that Yellen and her col­leagues are not influ­enced by their polit­i­cal alle­giances. They believe that pol­i­tics won’t affect the Fed’s deci­sions because its mem­bers are quar­an­tined from the influ­ence of voters.

This naivete is a char­ac­ter­is­tic of the gov­ern­ing class’s para­dox­i­cal views about democ­ra­cy.  On the one hand, it cham­pi­ons uni­ver­sal suf­frage and demo­c­ra­t­ic insti­tu­tions, while on the oth­er con­fer­ring enor­mous pow­er on peo­ple whose jobs don’t require win­ning any­one’s vote.  Hav­ing insu­lat­ed cer­tain gov­ern­ment enti­ties from the elec­torate, they assume that they have also inoc­u­lat­ed them against polit­i­cal motivations.

This elit­ist impulse is most clear­ly evi­dent in the exec­u­tive branch. The notion is that vest­ing pow­er in 2.7 mil­lion civ­il ser­vants, whose tenure is unaf­fect­ed by Pres­i­dents, elec­tions and job per­for­mance, has pro­duced high-mind­ed gov­ern­ment uncon­t­a­m­i­nat­ed by pol­i­tics.  Any­one who has worked in a gov­ern­ment bureau­cra­cy knows that many of the most high­ly moti­vat­ed civ­il ser­vants have polit­i­cal agen­das, which they rou­tine­ly impose with­in the spheres of their power.

The Supreme Court is a sec­ond exam­ple.  The Founders envi­sioned the judi­cia­ry as “the least dan­ger­ous branch,” since it could nei­ther make laws nor enforce them.  Instead it has become a vehi­cle for impos­ing the polit­i­cal and cul­tur­al sen­si­bil­i­ties of a clois­tered and homoge­nous elite on Amer­i­can soci­ety, con­tra­ven­ing acts of Con­gress, plebiscites, state con­sti­tu­tions and leg­is­la­tures in the process.

The Fed’s pre­sumed apo­lit­i­cal nature is a third exam­ple.  Its gov­er­nors stud­ied in the same uni­ver­si­ties and spent the bulk of their careers either teach­ing at those schools or seek­ing their for­tunes in the indus­try they now reg­u­late.  Their insu­lar­i­ty is con­sid­ered a virtue, allow­ing them to imple­ment eco­nom­ic the­o­ries they inter­nal­ized at uni­ver­si­ty, far removed from the real-life expe­ri­ences of the hun­dreds of mil­lions of peo­ple whose lives their deci­sions affect.

The Fed and its acolytes believe in their bones that eco­nom­ic pow­er should be entrust­ed to peo­ple like them, whose aca­d­e­m­ic cre­den­tials, tem­pera­ment and exper­tise require that they be kept at a safe dis­tance from democracy’s taint.

That may be true.  Maybe we’re bet­ter off con­fer­ring respon­si­bil­i­ty for many of the most impor­tant eco­nom­ic, social and cul­tur­al deci­sions to peo­ple we don’t elect.  But we shouldn’t imag­ine that shield­ing our judges, bureau­crats and Fed­er­al Reserve Board mem­bers from the polit­i­cal process removes pol­i­tics from their decision-making.

Trump’s alle­ga­tion that the Pres­i­dent told Yellen not to raise rates is pure fab­ri­ca­tion.  His con­tention that polit­i­cal cal­cu­la­tions fig­ure into the Fed’s deci­sions is exact­ly right.