Why Are We At War With The Islamic State?

Iraqi security forces and Shiite militia are among the ground troops on whom we rely in our war against the Islamic State. [Credit: Reuters]

Iraqi secu­ri­ty forces and Shi­ite mili­tia are among the ground troops on whom we rely in our war against the Islam­ic State. Their bru­tal­i­ty rivals that of IS. [Cred­it: Reuters]

[The sol­diers] dragged res­i­dents up to age 70 from their homes, beat­ing and curs­ing them with sec­tar­i­an slurs, Abu Omar [one of the sur­vivors] told Reuters by phone.  He said the fight­ers took the men’s mobiles and ID cards, then bound their hands, tying Abu Omar to his 12-year-old men­tal­ly ill son with rope. They did the same with his two old­er sons and three brothers.

The men were led a few hun­dred yards to a field where Abu Omar said more than a hun­dred oth­ers had been gath­ered.  For about two hours, they were forced to kneel and stare at the ground as the fight­ers select­ed their tar­gets and led them to a spot behind a mud wall.

“They took them behind the wall. Less than a minute, then a gun­shot,” said Abu Omar. “All we could hear was the gun­shots. We could­n’t see.”

This atroc­i­ty, which claimed the lives of 72 unarmed peo­ple in a vil­lage in Iraq’s Diyala Province, was not car­ried out by the Islam­ic State (IS). It was per­pe­trat­ed by our allies in the war against IS — Iraqi secu­ri­ty forces and Shi­ite militia.

More than six months after he launched a bomb­ing cam­paign intend­ed to res­cue mem­bers of an obscure cult known as the Yazidis from an IS siege, Pres­i­dent Oba­ma has asked Con­gress to autho­rize the Third Iraq War.

It’s just a cour­tesy, of course.  The Pres­i­dent believes that he needn’t both­er with Con­gress con­cern­ing such mat­ters as war and peace, immi­gra­tion, health care, and oth­er sub­jects con­sti­tu­tion­al­ly reserved to the leg­is­la­ture, the Con­sti­tu­tion being the obso­lete work of eigh­teenth cen­tu­ry elit­ists.  But the Pres­i­dent thinks it impor­tant to make Con­gress feel rel­e­vant to gov­er­nance of the Republic.

Con­gress has so far react­ed bad­ly to the President’s beaux geste.  Repub­li­cans object to the war resolution’s pro­hi­bi­tion of “endur­ing offen­sive ground oper­a­tions” as too lim­it­ing.  Democ­rats com­plain that the phrase’s vague­ness makes it too expan­sive.  Which is why the Pres­i­dent would much rather nego­ti­ate with aya­tol­lahs than with Congress.

What­ev­er comes of this exer­cise (our war efforts will con­tin­ue with or with­out Con­gres­sion­al approval), it is a use­ful one.  Use­ful because it forces a dis­cus­sion of why we’ve gone to war against IS, why we are con­duct­ing the war in such a pecu­liar way and what we hope to achieve.

Why Are We At War With IS?

The Pres­i­dent has var­i­ous­ly explained his ratio­nale for the war, but it seems to come down to this: he believes the Islam­ic State to be the worst ter­ror­ist group on earth.  They destroy vil­lages and mas­sacre their inhab­i­tants.  They take West­ern hostages, using ran­som as a prin­ci­pal rev­enue source and slaugh­ter­ing those whose ran­soms go unpaid.  And though their resort to bru­tal­i­ty and car­nage is pret­ty much what we’ve come to expect from every brand of Islamist fanati­cism, there is a the­atri­cal­i­ty about their exe­cu­tions that makes them more chill­ing.  When we see these videos, we want IS destroyed, which is the President’s stat­ed intention.

But is IS real­ly the worst ter­ror­ist group on earth?  I’m not con­vinced.  If there were Acad­e­my Awards in this cat­e­go­ry, nom­i­nees might include Boko Haram, Hamas, Hezbol­lah, the Houthis, the Tal­iban, the Kur­dish ter­ror­ists at the PKK and al Qae­da.  All of them rou­tine­ly com­mit atroc­i­ties and have seized con­trol of ter­ri­to­ries with­in sov­er­eign nations.  And yet, we’re pro­vid­ing air cov­er to the PKK, nego­ti­at­ing with the Houthis (who recent­ly over­threw the U.S.-backed regime in Yemen), have swapped pris­on­ers with the Tal­iban, report­ed­ly held secret talks with Hamas in pur­suit of a failed peace agree­ment between Israel and the Pales­tini­ans, have allowed al Qae­da to oper­ate large­ly unmo­lest­ed in Syr­ia, and are choos­ing to ignore Boko Haram and Hezbollah.

Why Are We Outsourcing Ground Combat?

Even if the Islam­ic State were the worst ter­ror­ists on earth, that would not be grounds for war.  Per­haps the Pres­i­dent has declared them such because his strat­e­gy involves out­sourc­ing ground com­bat to a coterie of mis­cre­ants.  His implic­it moral jus­ti­fi­ca­tion appears to be that our cobel­liger­ents are not quite as bad as our ene­my.  Maybe.  But they are plen­ty bad, as the account above illustrates.

Our Coali­tion of the Ugly But Will­ing includes Shi­ite mili­tia, Kur­dish ter­ror­ists, the Iran­ian mil­i­tary, Iraqi secu­ri­ty forces, and Assad’s Syr­i­an army.  When they win a bat­tle, fre­quent­ly with our air sup­port, may­hem can ensue.  Win­ning ter­ri­to­ry from IS often means that Shi­ites mas­sacre Sun­nis; los­ing that Sun­nis mas­sacre Shi­ites.  We facil­i­tate one and con­demn the other.

And while war nec­es­sar­i­ly involves moral com­pro­mise, our strate­gic deci­sion to rely on armies and fac­tions of evil pur­pose and mis­shapen moral­i­ty to pros­e­cute this war makes us com­plic­it in these atroc­i­ties.  Our airstrikes aid their ground assaults, though we know what will hap­pen should they – and we – succeed.

We are entrust­ing the con­duct of our war to peo­ple we know to be untrust­wor­thy because the Pres­i­dent has made “no boots on the ground” the lodestar of his for­eign and mil­i­tary pol­i­cy.  The Pres­i­dent defines this war by who we are against (IS) and what we are against doing (send­ing U.S. troops into ground com­bat).  Win­ning that war, how­ev­er, requires ground com­bat.  So we sup­port some very bad peo­ple who do some very bad things and con­sole our­selves with the thought that they are not as bad as the enemy.

What Happens If We Win?

The deci­sion to engage in war is con­cerned pri­mar­i­ly with ends and only sec­on­dar­i­ly with means.  For the Pres­i­dent, the dis­cus­sion is almost always about means: what we will do and, far more sig­nif­i­cant­ly, what we won’t.  The “no boots on the ground” stip­u­la­tion needs to be con­sid­ered in the con­text of anoth­er: the U.S. should not under­take mil­i­tary inter­ven­tion unless it advances our legit­i­mate interests.

The Pres­i­dent has yet to iden­ti­fy our inter­ests or artic­u­late our goals, beyond degrad­ing and destroy­ing IS.  So let’s ask our­selves, what if IS were destroyed – ban­ished from Iraq and Syr­ia, erased from the face of the earth, nev­er again to inflict itself on human­i­ty? What then?

That out­come is improb­a­ble, espe­cial­ly since IS, far from con­tract­ing, has spread beyond Iraq and Syr­ia to coun­tries through­out the Mid­dle East and North Africa.  But if IS were destroyed, there would be at least two pos­si­ble out­comes, nei­ther espe­cial­ly attrac­tive.  The first is that the land grab in which var­i­ous of our cobel­liger­ents have been engaged will take on some per­ma­nen­cy.  Kurds will con­sol­i­date their con­trol over the north­ern por­tion of Iraq and pro­claim inde­pen­dence from Bagh­dad.  Sun­ni trib­al chief­tains, should they decide to turn against IS, also will seek lib­er­a­tion from the Shi­ite-dom­i­nat­ed gov­ern­ment.  The con­se­quence of vic­to­ry could thus be an inher­ent­ly unsta­ble arrange­ment that divides ter­ri­to­ry – and con­trol of oil pro­duc­tion – among rival eth­nic, trib­al and reli­gious groups.  Fur­ther bar­bar­i­ty would almost cer­tain­ly ensue.

The oth­er pos­si­bil­i­ty is that Islam­ic State’s destruc­tion will return polit­i­cal bor­ders to those drawn by the Euro­peans after the First World War.  The map would be unchanged.  Syr­ia would still be Syr­ia and Iraq would com­prise its char­ac­ter­is­ti­cal­ly volatile mix of Sun­ni, Shi­ite and Kurd.   Assad will have sur­vived a civ­il war, his most potent ene­mies sub­dued thanks in no small mea­sure to U.S. airstrikes.  Baghdad’s Shi­ite-dom­i­nat­ed gov­ern­ment would, like Assad’s, serve as a repres­sive and reli­able client of Tehran.

In that sce­nario, Iran would cement its sta­tus as a Mid­dle East hege­mon, con­trol­ling either direct­ly or through clients ter­ri­to­ry extend­ing from the Mediter­ranean to the Pak­istan and Afghan fron­tier, and from Turkey to the Per­sian Gulf.  Sau­di Ara­bia would be brack­et­ed between Iraq to its north and Houthi-con­trolled Yemen to its south, with Israel remain­ing sand­wiched between the Iran­ian-backed thugs of Hezbol­lah and Hamas.  Our tra­di­tion­al allies will find them­selves in the shad­ow of a new Per­sian Empire.

Whether that is the President’s unspo­ken aim or mere­ly an out­come with which he’s com­fort­able is dif­fi­cult to say.  To the con­ster­na­tion of our tra­di­tion­al allies in the region, he has abet­ted Iran­ian hege­mo­ny from his first days in office.  Our rela­tion­ship with Iran is the lone sur­viv­ing frag­ment of the “smart” for­eign pol­i­cy that he and Mrs. Clin­ton launched in 2009.  The rest has turned to rubble.

His “reset” of rela­tions with Rus­sia has pro­duced a new Cold War.  His “piv­ot to Asia” was a dud.  His attempt to bro­ker an agree­ment between Israel and the Pales­tini­ans came to nought.  His embrace of “Arab Spring” has pro­duced mil­i­tary dic­ta­tor­ship in Egypt and resur­gent jihadism almost every­where else (Tunisia being the notable excep­tion).  Boko Haram is spread­ing ter­ror to a grow­ing list of sub-Saha­ran African coun­tries.  A coup insti­gat­ed by Iran has top­pled the U.S.-backed gov­ern­ment in Yemen.  Al Qae­da has not been “dec­i­mat­ed,” as pres­i­den­tial advis­er Susan Rice once claimed, but is spread­ing through­out the region, accord­ing to senior U.S. intel­li­gence offi­cials. The Admin­is­tra­tion’s mil­i­tary or diplo­mat­ic sup­port for regime change in Libya, Iraq and Ukraine has brought dis­as­ter to all three.

The only for­eign pol­i­cy con­stant has been the Pres­i­den­t’s man-crush on Iran’s Supreme Leader, kin­dled by exchanges of let­ters between the two. The Pres­i­dent seems deter­mined to legit­imize Iran’s nuclear enrich­ment pro­gram and to relieve the coun­try from sanc­tions, rais­ing con­cerns about the theoc­ra­cy acquir­ing nuclear weapons.  As Wal­ter Rus­sell Mead recent­ly observed in the Amer­i­can Inter­est, this effort has left the Pres­i­dent vir­tu­al­ly alone, with every­one from Hen­ry Kissinger to the Con­gres­sion­al wing of his own par­ty ques­tion­ing his strategy.

Mead spec­u­lates that the White House dreams of a Per­sian Spring, in which mod­er­ate Ira­ni­ans will top­ple the theocrats and gov­ern a mul­ti-eth­nic, mul­ti-lin­gual, mul­ti-con­fes­sion­al empire accord­ing to West­ern demo­c­ra­t­ic sensibilities.

Pres­i­dents, like all of us, are enti­tled to dream.  But if he has some goal in mind, some sense of what the region would look like if IS were indeed destroyed, then he has an oblig­a­tion to tell us plain­ly and to explain why this result is worth a war.

Con­gres­sion­al debate over autho­riz­ing mil­i­tary force is at this point aca­d­e­m­ic, but if it pro­duces a clear­er under­stand­ing of why we have cho­sen this war, it will have served a use­ful purpose.

4 thoughts on “Why Are We At War With The Islamic State?”

  1. The Kurds have been a U.S. ally for years, not the Sun­ni nor the Shia. Either way, the land will be split unless a nuclear dis­as­ter pre­vents that from hap­pen­ing. We are tak­ing a gam­ble in every­thing we do in the mid­dle east. Actions car­ry more pow­er than what is spo­ken. The Islam­ic caliphate has dis­played a dis­re­gard for all forms of soci­ety, even their own sec­tar­i­an cul­ture. Seems as if we are at odds with who we pick as our allies in the region. So far the Kurds have shown com­pas­sion to oth­er cul­tures and have stepped in where Iraq’s army has failed mis­er­ably. Clear­ly the Kur­dish are the most com­pe­tent par­ty in the region that gives a glim­mer of hope to most if the region. The Islam­ic caliphate mil­i­tants are sure­ly not our friends nor our allies. When I was in Iraq back in 2010, I would talk with local trans­la­tors or Terps about the sit­u­a­tion. These local terps nailed it when they spoke of vio­lence com­ing in the near future from Syr­ia, the place that most wealthy Iraqis sent their mon­ey dur­ing the Gulf War and 2005 U.S. occu­pa­tion. They spoke of Jor­dan and Turkey being safe havens for wealthy Iraqis that fled Iraq. Here we are five years lat­er, and it all came fruition. The plan was put well before I even arrived in Iraq in 2010. Syr­ia was one giant sleep­er cell that rise up and attacked Iraq and most like­ly gasses its own peo­ple just to insti­gate a World reac­tion. Well, it got a reac­tion to say the least. The Islamc caliphate mil­i­tants’ plan has back­fired and the World is angry. So, who do we trust now? We trust those that will deliv­er a result that is in the best inter­est of what we per­ceive as democ­ra­cy. The Kurds are the force in the region that can and will deliv­er. If the U.S. waits too long to back the Kur­dish, every gain may be a lost cause. Then we will be pay­ing thou­sands of dol­lars per bar­rel of oil to the Islam­ic caliphate mil­i­tants who will rule all of the oil fields of Iraq and then some. Iraq’s army has already proved that it does not poss­es the strength to win small bat­tles. The U.S. should be tak­ing the Islam­ic caliphate threat more seri­ous­ly than it is right now. The U.S. should arm the Kurds with small arms and the Kurds should allow the U.N. to move into the Kur­dish region with big­ger weapons it has com­plete con­trol over. Then, the gains made by the Kurds can be held with much high­er prob­a­bil­i­ty of suc­cess. What if the Kur­dish were total­ly destroyed by the Islam­ic caliphate mil­i­tants? What then?

    • Thanks for your very thought­ful com­ments. I agree that the Kurds are the clos­est thing to good guys in the region. I do put the PKK in a sep­a­rate cat­e­go­ry. The State Dept in 2012 declared the PKK to be Europe’s dead­liest ter­ror­ist group (they count Turkey as being part of Europe). That said, we’re mak­ing a mis­take to help Iran, Assad, the Shi­ite mili­tia and the oth­er bad guys over there. It will come back to bite us, par­tic­u­lar­ly if the end result is to make Iran the region­al hegemon.

  2. Before I depart­ed Iraq in 2011, the Ira­ni­ans were gain­ing a foothold in such areas as health care for the elder­ly and oth­er pub­lic ser­vices they used/use to stealth­ily encroach upon vul­ner­a­ble Iraqis. I see an upris­ing in Turkey com­ing some­time in the future as the Shia sect is gross­ly under­rep­re­sent­ed as well as oth­er reli­gious groups in Turkey. Why is Iran not doing any­thing about that? I sup­pose Iraq is Iran’s prize as the coun­try wields more and more pow­er over Iraq as time pass­es. Theoc­ra­cy real­ly has no place in the foun­da­tion of gov­er­nance any­where in the world. War tru­ly is a dou­ble-edged sword. The Islam­ic caliphate, along with its caliph, is tru­ly diabolical.

    • The IS is indeed dia­bol­i­cal, the clos­est thing to pure evil. But Iran is more dan­ger­ous, par­tic­u­lar­ly if they acquire nuclear weapons.

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