In Russia, Nothing Is True, Everything Is Possible

Russian media coverage of the downing of a passenger flight over eastern Ukraine included a number of fanciful theories. A new book tells of how the Kremlin reshapes the truth.

Russ­ian media cov­er­age of the down­ing of a pas­sen­ger flight over east­ern Ukraine includ­ed a num­ber of fan­ci­ful the­o­ries. A new book tells of how the Krem­lin reshapes the truth.

But what is a Russ­ian point of view? What does Rus­sia Today stand for?” I asked. 

“Oh, there is always a Russ­ian point of view,” he answered. “Take a banana. For some­one it’s food. For some­one else it’s a weapon. For a racist it’s some­thing to tease a black per­son with.”

Noth­ing Is True And Every­thing Is Pos­si­ble, Peter Pomer­ant­sev


When a Malaysian Air­lines pas­sen­ger flight was shot down over rebel-con­trolled east­ern Ukraine last July, Russ­ian media adamant­ly denied that rebel forces were responsible.

Instead they float­ed a series of alter­na­tive the­o­ries, among them that Russia’s ene­mies had secret­ly recov­ered the wreck­age of a Malaysian Air­lines flight that had gone miss­ing the pre­vi­ous March and dumped it in east­ern Ukraine.  Anoth­er had it that the plane was car­ry­ing corpses and not live pas­sen­gers when it left Ams­ter­dam.  Anoth­er that it was a failed assas­si­na­tion attempt by the Ukrain­ian mil­i­tary, which shot down the plane in the mis­tak­en belief that Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin was on board.

By gen­er­at­ing a fog of fan­tasies, the Krem­lin obscured the expla­na­tion that almost cer­tain­ly is true: Russ­ian-backed rebels blew the plane out of the sky.

Truth in the hands of the new Russ­ian media is infi­nite­ly mal­leable and nev­er dull.  Most impor­tant­ly, it can be shaped to rein­force the “Russ­ian point of view,” the per­spec­tive pre­ferred by its polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic elites.

In Noth­ing Is True And Every­thing Is Pos­si­ble (Perseus Books Group, 2014), Peter Pomer­ant­sev recounts his expe­ri­ence as a doc­u­men­tary pro­duc­er for a Russ­ian tele­vi­sion net­work, offer­ing an enter­tain­ing and infor­ma­tive account of how the Russ­ian media accom­plish­es what he calls “the weaponiza­tion of information.”

Pomer­ant­sev didn’t work for Rus­sia Today, but for an enter­tain­ment net­work called TNT, an enter­prise the author describes as “a news-free zone” and “a piece of sub­ver­sive pop-art.”  Pomerantsev’s sub­jects gen­er­al­ly weren’t gov­ern­ment fig­ures but more pro­sa­ic types, like pas­sen­gers leav­ing and arriv­ing from Moscow’s Domode­do­vo air­port or Ukrain­ian pros­ti­tutes serv­ing a well-heeled Moscow clien­tele.  But though his pro­duc­tions were not explic­it­ly polit­i­cal, they were a means of pre­sent­ing the government’s ver­sion of real­i­ty for a pre­dom­i­nant­ly young audience.

Russ­ian tele­vi­sion, accord­ing to Pomer­ant­sev, is “the cen­tral mech­a­nism of a new type of author­i­tar­i­an­ism.”  Unlike Sovi­et-style tele­vi­sion that served up bland pro­pa­gan­da, con­tem­po­rary Russ­ian tele­vi­sion is a savory con­coc­tion that “synthesize[s] Sovi­et con­trol with West­ern enter­tain­ment.” It teas­es and tit­il­lates and, as with any seduc­tion, does so with sin­gle-mind­ed purpose.

Pomerantsev’s doc­u­men­taries take us inside Moscow’s exclu­sive and debauched clubs, where beau­ti­ful young women seek to find their “Forbes” – as in the Forbes list of the world’s rich­est men – Russ­ian oli­garchs who fre­quent the clubs for vod­ka, drugs and sex. Women from the provinces, hop­ing to escape their drea­ry lives, attend spe­cial schools that train them in the art of lur­ing a wealthy man (“when you desire some­thing from a man, place your­self at his left, irra­tional, emo­tion­al side”).

Some alum­nae attain a min­i­mal lev­el of suc­cess, being tak­en as mis­tress­es and housed in upscale apart­ments that the Forbes can fre­quent dur­ing the week.  For most, it ends there, as the man moves on to oth­er inter­ests.  But for the for­tu­nate few, it cul­mi­nates in mar­riage, bring­ing wealth and finan­cial secu­ri­ty.  They find a man with whom they can be as “behind a stone wall,” shel­tered from life’s ugly vicissitudes.

The quest for that stone wall takes many forms, and Pomerantsev’s doc­u­men­taries find peo­ple obsessed with its pur­suit: Russ­ian gang­sters turned film­mak­ers, spir­i­tu­al char­la­tans, father­less young women seek­ing their Forbes, media types whom he describes as “cyn­i­cal and enlight­ened” in their con­vic­tion that “every­thing is PR,” busi­ness own­ers impris­oned for imag­ined crimes.  All seek their stone wall, a place of sta­bil­i­ty and control.

Devo­tion to that search is under­stand­able in a cul­ture that over the past quar­ter cen­tu­ry has endured dizzy­ing change.  “Sovi­et stag­na­tion,” Pomer­ant­sev reminds us, “led to per­e­stroi­ka, which led to the col­lapse of the Sovi­et Union, lib­er­al eupho­ria, eco­nom­ic dis­as­ter, oli­garchy and the mafia state.”

“How can you believe in any­thing,” he asks, “when every­thing around you is chang­ing so fast?”

Russ­ian tele­vi­sion exploits this pre­vail­ing sense of anomie in ser­vice of the state.  It presents mul­ti­ple real­i­ties for both for­eign and domes­tic con­sump­tion.  With Rus­sia Today,

“the Krem­lin switch­es mes­sages at will to its advan­tage, climb­ing inside every­thing: Euro­pean right-wing nation­al­ists are seduced with anti-EU rhetoric; the far left is coopt­ed with tales of fight­ing U.S. hege­mo­ny; U.S. reli­gious con­ser­v­a­tives are con­vinced by the Kremlin’s fight against homo­sex­u­al­i­ty.  And the result is an array of voic­es, work­ing away at glob­al audi­ences from dif­fer­ent angles, pro­duc­ing a cumu­la­tive echo cham­ber of Krem­lin sup­port, all broad­cast on RT [Rus­sia Today].”

But the Krem­lin’s pri­ma­ry audi­ence is domes­tic, nour­ish­ing the cult of Putin not by sup­press­ing his polit­i­cal oppo­nents, but by pro­mot­ing them.  “It climbs inside all ide­olo­gies and move­ments,” Pomer­ant­sev writes, “exploit­ing and ren­der­ing them absurd.”

“Rus­sia does have elec­tions, but the ‘oppo­si­tion’ with its almost com­i­cal lead­ers, is designed and fund­ed in such a way as to actu­al­ly strength­en the Krem­lin: when the beet­root-faced com­mu­nists and the spit­ting nation­al­ists row on TV polit­i­cal debat­ing shows, the view­er is left with the feel­ing that, com­pared with this lot, the Pres­i­dent is the only sane candidate.”

Russ­ian media con­sis­tent­ly por­tray Putin as stand­ing firm amid chaos.  He alone brings “sta­bil­i­ty” out of “con­fu­sion and twi­light.”  He is the “effec­tive man­ag­er,” the one who gets things done, the cen­ter that holds against cen­trifu­gal social, cul­tur­al and polit­i­cal forces, that stands strong in the face of West­ern and Islamist men­aces.  With him as leader, Rus­sia stands as “behind a stone wall.”

By telling the Russ­ian media’s sto­ry from the inside, Pomer­ant­sev helps explain Putin’s pop­u­lar­i­ty.  But while the tales of the char­ac­ters are well told, one gets the impres­sion that much more is at work out­side the range of his unblink­ing lens.

The world Pomer­ant­sev presents cen­ters to a great extent on the relent­less­ly sec­u­lar, includ­ing Moscow’s glit­terati and their hang­ers-on.  Theirs is a world that revolves around the sorts of Rus­sians with whom we’re most famil­iar and against whom West­ern sanc­tions take aim: oli­garchs who own NBA fran­chis­es and Pre­mier League soc­cer clubs, who snap up pricey Lon­don real estate and pop­u­late its finan­cial dis­tricts. They and their ret­inues ven­er­ate Putin and pledge him their feal­ty because they would for­feit their wealth, and per­haps their lives in the bar­gain, if they crossed him.

It is less clear what Rus­sians of more ordi­nary means, espe­cial­ly those who prac­tice tra­di­tion­al reli­gion, see in the for­mer KGB oper­a­tive.  For sev­en­ty years, che­ka and church were sworn ene­mies.  Putin has some­how rec­on­ciled the two, the ruth­less oper­a­tive who is a devout Ortho­dox Chris­t­ian, the shirt­less chest that sports a cross.

Pomerantsev’s book touch­es light­ly on Putin’s pop­u­lar­i­ty with this siz­able seg­ment of Russ­ian soci­ety.  He does note com­ments by the Ortho­dox Church’s Arch­man­drite Tikhon that ancient Byzan­tium and Mus­covy could only flour­ish under one great auto­crat.  “This is why we need the Pres­i­dent to be like a tsar,” Tikhon says.

It is a reveal­ing and provoca­tive state­ment, but Pomer­ant­sev lets it hang there, as though Ortho­doxy were just anoth­er cult, rather than a source of Russ­ian iden­ti­ty.  He does not take time to explore how Putin could be revered as a mes­sian­ic fig­ure both by the Ortho­dox faith­ful and by god­less devo­tees of “restora­tion hedonism.”

But Pomer­ant­sev did not set out to offer a com­pre­hen­sive account of the Russ­ian psy­che, just a documentarian’s take on how the Krem­lin’s media machine manip­u­lates a peo­ple caught in a kalei­do­scop­ic reality.

Pomer­ant­sev has done all of that in this brisk and insight­ful account of the Russ­ian point of view.

One thought on “In Russia, Nothing Is True, Everything Is Possible”

  1. Pingback: Rien n'est vrai, tout est possible - Editions Saint-Simon

Comments are closed.