
Russian media coverage of the downing of a passenger flight over eastern Ukraine included a number of fanciful theories. A new book tells of how the Kremlin reshapes the truth.
But what is a Russian point of view? What does Russia Today stand for?” I asked.
“Oh, there is always a Russian point of view,” he answered. “Take a banana. For someone it’s food. For someone else it’s a weapon. For a racist it’s something to tease a black person with.”
Nothing Is True And Everything Is Possible, Peter Pomerantsev
When a Malaysian Airlines passenger flight was shot down over rebel-controlled eastern Ukraine last July, Russian media adamantly denied that rebel forces were responsible.
Instead they floated a series of alternative theories, among them that Russia’s enemies had secretly recovered the wreckage of a Malaysian Airlines flight that had gone missing the previous March and dumped it in eastern Ukraine. Another had it that the plane was carrying corpses and not live passengers when it left Amsterdam. Another that it was a failed assassination attempt by the Ukrainian military, which shot down the plane in the mistaken belief that Russian President Vladimir Putin was on board.
By generating a fog of fantasies, the Kremlin obscured the explanation that almost certainly is true: Russian-backed rebels blew the plane out of the sky.
Truth in the hands of the new Russian media is infinitely malleable and never dull. Most importantly, it can be shaped to reinforce the “Russian point of view,” the perspective preferred by its political and economic elites.
In Nothing Is True And Everything Is Possible (Perseus Books Group, 2014), Peter Pomerantsev recounts his experience as a documentary producer for a Russian television network, offering an entertaining and informative account of how the Russian media accomplishes what he calls “the weaponization of information.”
Pomerantsev didn’t work for Russia Today, but for an entertainment network called TNT, an enterprise the author describes as “a news-free zone” and “a piece of subversive pop-art.” Pomerantsev’s subjects generally weren’t government figures but more prosaic types, like passengers leaving and arriving from Moscow’s Domodedovo airport or Ukrainian prostitutes serving a well-heeled Moscow clientele. But though his productions were not explicitly political, they were a means of presenting the government’s version of reality for a predominantly young audience.
Russian television, according to Pomerantsev, is “the central mechanism of a new type of authoritarianism.” Unlike Soviet-style television that served up bland propaganda, contemporary Russian television is a savory concoction that “synthesize[s] Soviet control with Western entertainment.” It teases and titillates and, as with any seduction, does so with single-minded purpose.
Pomerantsev’s documentaries take us inside Moscow’s exclusive and debauched clubs, where beautiful young women seek to find their “Forbes” – as in the Forbes list of the world’s richest men – Russian oligarchs who frequent the clubs for vodka, drugs and sex. Women from the provinces, hoping to escape their dreary lives, attend special schools that train them in the art of luring a wealthy man (“when you desire something from a man, place yourself at his left, irrational, emotional side”).
Some alumnae attain a minimal level of success, being taken as mistresses and housed in upscale apartments that the Forbes can frequent during the week. For most, it ends there, as the man moves on to other interests. But for the fortunate few, it culminates in marriage, bringing wealth and financial security. They find a man with whom they can be as “behind a stone wall,” sheltered from life’s ugly vicissitudes.
The quest for that stone wall takes many forms, and Pomerantsev’s documentaries find people obsessed with its pursuit: Russian gangsters turned filmmakers, spiritual charlatans, fatherless young women seeking their Forbes, media types whom he describes as “cynical and enlightened” in their conviction that “everything is PR,” business owners imprisoned for imagined crimes. All seek their stone wall, a place of stability and control.
Devotion to that search is understandable in a culture that over the past quarter century has endured dizzying change. “Soviet stagnation,” Pomerantsev reminds us, “led to perestroika, which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, liberal euphoria, economic disaster, oligarchy and the mafia state.”
“How can you believe in anything,” he asks, “when everything around you is changing so fast?”
Russian television exploits this prevailing sense of anomie in service of the state. It presents multiple realities for both foreign and domestic consumption. With Russia Today,
“the Kremlin switches messages at will to its advantage, climbing inside everything: European right-wing nationalists are seduced with anti-EU rhetoric; the far left is coopted with tales of fighting U.S. hegemony; U.S. religious conservatives are convinced by the Kremlin’s fight against homosexuality. And the result is an array of voices, working away at global audiences from different angles, producing a cumulative echo chamber of Kremlin support, all broadcast on RT [Russia Today].”
But the Kremlin’s primary audience is domestic, nourishing the cult of Putin not by suppressing his political opponents, but by promoting them. “It climbs inside all ideologies and movements,” Pomerantsev writes, “exploiting and rendering them absurd.”
“Russia does have elections, but the ‘opposition’ with its almost comical leaders, is designed and funded in such a way as to actually strengthen the Kremlin: when the beetroot-faced communists and the spitting nationalists row on TV political debating shows, the viewer is left with the feeling that, compared with this lot, the President is the only sane candidate.”
Russian media consistently portray Putin as standing firm amid chaos. He alone brings “stability” out of “confusion and twilight.” He is the “effective manager,” the one who gets things done, the center that holds against centrifugal social, cultural and political forces, that stands strong in the face of Western and Islamist menaces. With him as leader, Russia stands as “behind a stone wall.”
By telling the Russian media’s story from the inside, Pomerantsev helps explain Putin’s popularity. But while the tales of the characters are well told, one gets the impression that much more is at work outside the range of his unblinking lens.
The world Pomerantsev presents centers to a great extent on the relentlessly secular, including Moscow’s glitterati and their hangers-on. Theirs is a world that revolves around the sorts of Russians with whom we’re most familiar and against whom Western sanctions take aim: oligarchs who own NBA franchises and Premier League soccer clubs, who snap up pricey London real estate and populate its financial districts. They and their retinues venerate Putin and pledge him their fealty because they would forfeit their wealth, and perhaps their lives in the bargain, if they crossed him.
It is less clear what Russians of more ordinary means, especially those who practice traditional religion, see in the former KGB operative. For seventy years, cheka and church were sworn enemies. Putin has somehow reconciled the two, the ruthless operative who is a devout Orthodox Christian, the shirtless chest that sports a cross.
Pomerantsev’s book touches lightly on Putin’s popularity with this sizable segment of Russian society. He does note comments by the Orthodox Church’s Archmandrite Tikhon that ancient Byzantium and Muscovy could only flourish under one great autocrat. “This is why we need the President to be like a tsar,” Tikhon says.
It is a revealing and provocative statement, but Pomerantsev lets it hang there, as though Orthodoxy were just another cult, rather than a source of Russian identity. He does not take time to explore how Putin could be revered as a messianic figure both by the Orthodox faithful and by godless devotees of “restoration hedonism.”
But Pomerantsev did not set out to offer a comprehensive account of the Russian psyche, just a documentarian’s take on how the Kremlin’s media machine manipulates a people caught in a kaleidoscopic reality.
Pomerantsev has done all of that in this brisk and insightful account of the Russian point of view.
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